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Abstract 
This paper explores the factors propelling Islamic bank’s non-performing financing in 
Malaysia for the period of 2010Q4 and 2016Q3. Dynamic OLS is employed to examine the effects 
of macroeconomic and bank specific variables on each financing categories (mortgage, business 
and consumer financing). The findings tend to indicate that macroeconomic variables, particularly, 
the unemployment rate, have strong impact on the level of non-performing financing for each 
financing portfolio. Adoption of effective risk management policy may ensure to mitigate the 
systematic risks derived from macroeconomic changes and enhance the level of quality of asset. 
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1. Introduction 
Non-performing financing is the most crucial issue in the banking system whether in the 
conventional or Islamic banks. More importantly, level of non-performing financing as a measure 
of ex post credit risk provides information about the stability of banking system. The unique 
features of Islamic banks are that it prohibits interest-based financing but takes a vital part in 
extending financing to its customers which can be categorized into three main industry segments 
namely mortgage (house financing), business (commercial), and consumer (retail) through various 
Islamic financial contracts mainly comprised of sale-based, lease-based and equity-based. 
The rationale behind the prohibition of interest is based upon values of justice (‘adl), 
cooperation (ta’awun), efficiency, stability and growth. Considering the unique features of diverse 
types of financial contracts used in Islamic banks and the ethical approach adopted in its focus and 
objective of extending financing, it is therefore interesting to know whether Islamic banks have 
managed to ring-fence itself from the deterioration of credit quality caused by both the external 
macroeconomic determinants as well as its own internal resource capabilities. 
There are a number of studies which examined macro determinants of non-performing 
financings in conventional commercial banks. However, this study is motivated on only Islamic 
banks in view of the uniqueness of its products and business which focus on real production and 
good faith that may provide some mitigation on the credit risk as has been experienced throughout 
the economic crisis thus far. Unlike its conventional counterpart, the empirical evidence of non-
performing financing link in Islamic bank on changes in macroeconomic variables or the 
composition of products types is still considered as an underdeveloped area. Thus, it raises the 
motivation to capture whether the Islamic financing assets quality is susceptible towards the 
changes in selected key macroeconomic variables as well as the internal bank’s specific 
determinants which vary between three broad product categories stated earlier. 
Many studies focused on macro-microeconomic and bank specific determinants of asset 
quality in Islamic banking system but none has ever focused on the impact of those variables on 
different product types of financing asset quality in Islamic banks. This paper is to bridge this gap 
by examining the determinants of non-performing financing in the Malaysian banking sector with 
the hypothesis that both macroeconomic changes and Islamic bank’s financing concentration 
influence assets quality. 
Briefly, the objective of this study can be summarized as follows: 
a) To determine the effect of macroeconomic changes such as the unemployment rate, 
real gross domestic product growth and real lending rates on non-performing financing. 
b) To examine if the addition of bank-specific variables (solvency ratio, inefficiency, 
leverage ratio) in the baseline model contributes to the explanation of non-performing financing 
across the three different financing categories. The choice of bank-specific variables is based on 
hypotheses which have been put forward in the literature studies. 
From this study, it is hoped that the paper would be able to substantiate whether non-
performing financing is confined to concentration of any specific assets (such as Murabahah in 
mortgages) and if so the move towards diversifying to other types of products may be required. It 
is common for the Islamic banks to match a particular product type to the nature of financing in 
view of its practicality and convenience and not so based on the demand from the customers. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, the overview of non-performing 
financing in the Malaysian banking system is briefly discussed.  Section 3 reviews the theoretical 
and empirical literature on the determinants of non-performing financing and provides the 
hypotheses relating bank-specific variables to non-performing financing. Section 4 describes data, 
methodology and model, while Section 5 presents empirical findings and discussion. Finally, 
Section 6 presents concluding remarks and policy implication. 
 
2. Overview of non-performing financing in the Malaysian Islamic banking 
system 
Recently, Malaysian Islamic banks has been experiencing greater growth stability and 
better asset quality when compared to their counterparts in neighbor countries (Global Credit 
Research, 2016). The outperformance of Malaysian Islamic banks in terms of asset quality ad 
growth comes from establishing comprehensive legal, tax and regulatory frameworks that support 
Islamic finance. Although commercial banks in Malaysia is experiencing slower growth in Islamic 
financing due to slowdown in economy, Moody's report indicates that in 2015, the Malaysian 
Islamic banking sector constituted 27% of total banking system assets. Moreover, the non-
performing financing ratio on the Islamic assets of Malaysian banks is falling well below that of 
their conventional loans. 
Malaysia's Islamic banks’ non-performing financing ratio stood at 1.04 % as of September 
2016, compared with the ratio of 1.11 % in the previous month. Malaysia's non-performing 
financing ratio data has been given monthly for both Islamic banks and conventional banks since 
January 2006 by Bank Negara Malaysia. The data reached an all-time high of 2.9 % in May 2010 
and a record low of 0.94 % in December 2015. (Figure 1) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Non-performing financing of Islamic banks. 
 
                     Source: Bank Negara Malaysia 
 
In Malaysian Islamic banking system, financing is regarded as impaired, where the 
principal or profit or both is past due for more than 90 days or 3 months. In the case of revolving 
facilities, the facility becomes impaired, where the outstanding amount has remained in excess of 
the approved limit for a period of more than 90 days or 3 months (BNM, 2011). Moreover, 
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according to guideline, functions regarding the financing impairment methodology should be 
executed by competent and well-trained personnel and properly documented, with clear 
explanations of the supporting analyses, assumptions used and rationale. 
Financing to the household sector significantly increased which has been driven by 
sustained economic growth (IMF, 2014). Business financing and consumer financing have been 
growing rapidly, alongside mortgages: mortgage financing currently accounts for 37 percent of 
total Islamic bank financing (Figure 2). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Financing by type 
 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia 
However, this may be a concern, because potential risks could occur due to global 
economic recession which adversely affects the labor market and results in strains in households. 
Therefore, Bank Negara Malaysia has regularly assessed household financial buffers to be at 
comfortable levels. The central bank keep careful watch by conducting continuous risk assessment 
(Financial Stability and Payment Systems Report 2016, BNM). 
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 3. Literature review 
There are many empirical studies which have examined the impact of the macroeconomic 
conditions and bank-specific characteristics on non-performing financing. Most of them is 
considered either macroeconomic or bank-specific determinants of problem financing. 
Keeton and Morris (1987) and Sinkey and Greenwalt (1991) are among early studies 
evaluating the macroeconomic variables and bank asset quality relations for the US. Keeton and 
Morris (1987) investigate the determinants of loan loss diversity using a sample of approximately 
2,400 US commercial banks over the period 1979 and 1985. By employing simple linear 
regressions, researchers found that difference in local economic conditions and unusually poor 
performance of agriculture and energy sectors contributed to substantial part of variation in loan 
losses in the US commercial banks. Moreover, Sinkey and Greenwalt (1991) examines big US 
commercial banks during the period of 1984and 1987 using log-linear regression. Their finding 
indicate that loan-loss rates were positively associated with loan rates, volatile funds, and loan 
volume during the consecutive three years.  
Rinaldi and Sanchis-Arellano (2006), Berge and Boye (2007), Boss et al. (2009) and 
Louzis et al (2010) also provide empirical evidence for the relationship between macroeconomic 
environment and financing quality. Rinaldi and Sanchis-Arellano (2006) considers various sources 
of problem financing including the ratio of total household debt to household disposable income, 
real disposable income per household, the ratio of household gross financial assets to disposable 
income, real lending interest rate, the unemployment rate and finally the inflation rate, which is 
constructed using fully modified OLS. Empirical finding show that disposable income, monetary 
conditions and unemployment affect strongly on non-performing loans in European banks. 
Furthermore, Berge and Boye (2007) widen the analysis to the Nordic banking system for 
the period of 1993 and 2005. The strong relations between problem loans and the unemployment 
rate as well as the real interest rates are again documented. Meanwhile, Boss et al. (2009) utilizes 
macroeconomic stress testing in measuring the impact of an economic downturn on individual 
banks or on the entire financial system.  
The analysis for the effect of bank-specific characteristics on non-performing loans is 
further undertaken by Berger and DeYoung (1997), Podpiera and Weill (2008) and Li et al. (2007). 
Like Berger and DeYoung (1997) and Podpiera and Weill (2008) examine the impacts of 
efficiency indicators on bad loans for US commercial banks and Czech banks, respective. 
However, unlike Podpiera and Weill (2008), Berger and DeYoung (1997) formulate hypothesized 
relationship between problem loans and measured cost effciency, namely ‘bad luck’, ‘bad 
management’, ‘skimping’ and ‘moral hazard’ problems. Employing Granger-causality techniques, 
they find that high levels of non-performing loans lead banks to raise costs on monitoring and thus 
declines in measured cost efficiency cause to growth of future problem loans. Meanwhile, Podpiera 
and Weill (2008) extend findings on this line of the research and documents evidence supporting 
a negative relationship between decreased cost efficiency and future bad loans.  
In a subsequent study, Li et al. (2007) examines the impact of incentive contracts on 
performance. More specifically, their empirical findings suggest that bank manager's performance 
in improvement of asset quality is positively associated with the incentive contracts. 
Departing from the aforementioned studies that have a main focus on focus on either 
macroeconomic or bank-specific determinants of bad financing, several studies investigate both 
determinants together. Notable among these studies are Dash and Kabra (2010) and Louzis et al 
(2012). Dash and Kabra (2010) evaluates the issue for Indian banking system by considering 
macroeconomic determinants of asset quality such as GDP, construction expenditure, growth rate 
in per capita income, foreign exchange reserves, stock market volatility and bank-specific 
determinants of asset quality, namely, repo rate and lending rates. By employing random and fixed 
effects model, they report that higher interest rate and exchange rates cause higher non-performing 
financing in commercial banks. 
More interestingly, Louzis et al (2012) extend the analysis to nine largest Greek banks for 
the period 2003Q1-2009Q3 from different angles. They examine the determinants of problem 
loans, separately for each loan category. Adopting dynamic panel data methods, they highlight the 
importance of sources of problem loans. More specifically, they document consistent evidence 
supporting the statistical significance of real GDP growth rate, the unemployment rate, the lending 
rates and management quality in explaining the level of non-performing loans. Besides, their 
results suggest that the impact of macroeconomic factors on problem loan varies among loan 
categories, indicating problem mortgages are the least sensitive to changes in the macroeconomic 
environment. 
While these studies differ in terms of countries covered, data structure, time periods, 
measurement and sources of problem loans, they seem to provide a fairly consensus view that non-
performing financing is affected by both macroeconomic conditions and bank-specific 
characteristics. However, in the literature, several studies have found Islamic banking practices 
differs from conventional banks due to the Sharia-compliant business model (Iqbal, 2001, Ariss, 
2010; Beck, 2013; Hanif, 2014, Bilal, 2015 and so on) and their findings motivated other 
researchers to identify the issues regarding Islamic banking and to suggest solution for them. 
Shamsudheen and Masih (2015), Firmansyah (2015) and Sukmana (2016) are among few 
empirical studies that investigate the impact of macroeconomic and bank specific variables on 
non-performing financing in Islamic banks. Firmansyah (2015) and Sukmana (2016) both look at 
Islamic banks in Indonesia to examine the determinant of non-performing financing. Using the 
monthly data of Islamic banks spanning 2010-2012, Firmansyah (2015) found size and efficiency 
of the Islamic banks have no statistical significant impact on the non-performing loan. He further 
points out that economic growth and inflation have negative relationship with the non-performing 
loan. Meanwhile, employing time series econometric techniques, Sukmana (2016) find evidence 
that financing rate is significant effect on non-performing financing. 
Furthermore, Shamsudheen and Masih (2015) further analyze the short and long run impact 
of interest rate (KLIBOR) on Islamic bank’s nonperforming loan rate in Malaysia. They add 
further evidence supporting that the interest rate (KLIBOR) has impact only in the short run and 
shows the insignificant impact in the long run. 
 
3.1 Hypotheses relating bank-specific variables to non-performing financing 
‘Bad management’ hypothesis: Berger and DeYoung (1997) state that there is positive 
relationship between low cost efficiency and growth in future non-performing financing. He points 
out that 'bad' managers may (a) have poor skills in credit scoring, (b) be less than fully competent 
in appraising the value of pledged collateral, and (c) have difficulty monitoring and controlling the 
borrowers after issuance of loans. Likewise, Podpiera and Weill (2008) also document strong 
evidence in favor of the bad management hypothesis. 
‘Moral hazard’ hypothesis: low-capitalization of banks result in a growth in problem 
financing. According to the hypothesis stated by Berger and DeYoung (1997), banks with 
relatively low capital react to moral hazard incentives through raise the riskiness of their credit 
portfolios, which leads to higher future problem loans. Salas and Saurina (2002) provides evidence 
supporting the moral hazard hypothesis that there is a statistically significant negative effect of the 
lagged solvency ratio on non-performing financing. 
‘Too big to fail’ hypothesis: Large banks tend to engage more in risky and multiple 
activities to grow in size, increasing their leverage under the “too big to fail presumption” - 
regulators are reluctant to close large complex banks. As a result, they may grow their level of 
leverage too much and extend financing without considering the borrowers’ quality. 
Empirical studies do not provide clear-cut evidence for Islamic banks. Although it is 
expected that Islamic banks does not take excess leverage because of Shariah principles, earlier 
researches revealed the importance of leverage in Islamic banks’ practices as well, indicating that 
Islamic banks have incentives to undertake more risks in favor of growth in profitability (Bashir, 
2011). 
 
4. Data and theoretical model  
4.1 Data 
Quarterly macroeconomic and bank-specific panel data for eight Malaysian Islamic banks 
from 2010Q4 to 2016Q3, the period of which is dictated by data availability, make a total of 192 
observations. The quarterly data for non-performing financing for each loan categories have been 
obtained from quarterly financial results of Malaysian Islamic banks. The difference in term of 
disclosure of information in balance-sheet among Islamic banks in Malaysia limits our number of 
banks to only eight. We have classified financing portfolio of Islamic banks into three categories: 
mortgages, business and consumer financing. 
The quarterly data included non-performing financing for each financing categories, 
unemployment rate, real gross domestic product growth, real lending rate, solvency ratio, 
inefficiency ratio and leverage ratio. Definitions and sources of all variables are reported in Table 
1. 
Table 1. Definition and sources of variables. 
Variable Definition/Source Hypothesis tested 
Unemployment  The unemployment rate is the number of 
unemployed people expressed as a proportion 
of the labor force 
Source: DataStream 
positive (+) 
Real GDP growth Gross domestic product adjusted for price 
changes. 
Source: Bloomberg 
Positive (+) 
Real lending rate Lending rate adjusted for inflation 
Source: Bloomberg 
Positive (+) 
Solvency ratio Owned capital to risk weighted assets ratio 
Source: Bloomberg 
‘‘Moral hazard’’ (-) 
Inefficiency ratio Operating expenses to operating incomes ratio 
Source: Bloomberg 
‘‘Good Management’’(+) 
Leverage ratio Total liabilities to total assets ratio 
Source: Bloomberg 
‘‘Too-big-to-fail’’ (+) 
 
4.2 Theoretical model 
The model used in this analysis is adopted by the typical formulation postulated by 
economic theory and recent literature for the time persistence in the non-performing financings 
structure. Following common practices in panel cointegration studies, we consider a bivariate 
long-run relationship of the form: 
𝑁𝑃𝐹𝑖𝑡
ℎ =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑡
ℎ (𝑈𝑁𝐸) + 𝛽2𝑡
ℎ (𝐺𝐷𝑃) +  𝛽3𝑡
ℎ (𝑅𝐿𝑅) + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                 Eq.1 
where,  𝑁𝑃𝐹𝑖𝑡
ℎ   is non-performing financing, h denotes the type of non-performing 
financing. UNE is unemployment rate, GDP – the real gross domestic product growth. RLR is 
lending rate adjusted for inflation. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is bank-specific variables for testing hypothesis. We 
estimate the baseline model in Eq. (1) separately for each non-performing financing categories. 
As our main interest is on the long-run effect, it is not important to focus on the variable 
lags through which macroeconomic and bank-specific variables will impact non-performing 
financing. 
We test the “moral hazard” hypothesis by formulating Eq. (2) as follows: 
𝑁𝑃𝐹𝑖𝑡
ℎ =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑡
ℎ (𝑈𝑁𝐸) + 𝛽2𝑡
ℎ (𝐺𝐷𝑃) +  𝛽3𝑡
ℎ (𝑅𝐿𝑅) + 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡            Eq.2 
where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 stands for capital adequacy ratio. 
Furthermore, we add into our equation inefficiency ratio to test “bad management” 
hypothesis, Eq3 as follows: 
𝑁𝑃𝐹𝑖𝑡
ℎ =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑡
ℎ (𝑈𝑁𝐸) + 𝛽2𝑡
ℎ (𝐺𝐷𝑃) +  𝛽3𝑡
ℎ (𝑅𝐿𝑅) + 𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡              Eq.3 
where CTI is inefficiency ratio calculated by cost to income ratio. 
Lastly, we test “too big to fail” hypothesis. Eq4 as follows: 
𝑁𝑃𝐹𝑖𝑡
ℎ =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑡
ℎ (𝑈𝑁𝐸) + 𝛽2𝑡
ℎ (𝐺𝐷𝑃) +  𝛽3𝑡
ℎ (𝑅𝐿𝑅) + 𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡               Eq.4 
where LR stands for leverage ratio measured by total liabilities to total assets. 
Regressions consist of two cointegrated variables that has a stationary error term, 𝜀𝑖𝑡, which 
indicates that no relevant integrated variables are omitted; any omitted nonstationary variable that 
is part of the cointegrating relationship would enter the error term, thus producing nonstationary 
residuals and thus leading to a failure to detect cointegration (Hazer et al, 2012). Moreover, 
equations assume that non-performing financing variables are endogenous in the sense that, in the 
long-run, changes in macroeconomic and banks-specific variables result in changes in level of 
non-performing financings. According to our sample, the use of large sample period encourages 
panel cointegration methods which can be implemented with shorter data spans than their time-
series counterparts. 
 
5. Application and discussion of results  
This section analysis the long-run impact of macroeconomic bank-specific variables on 
level of non-performing financing of Islamic banks in Malaysia. More specifically, we employ 
such panel data techniques which can take care of small sample bias and simultaneity bias. In this 
section, first we begin our analysis testing panel unit root test and then test the existence of 
theoretical long-run relationship among variables. 
5.1. Panel unit root test 
We use the panel unit root test of Im et al. (2003; Im, Pesaran and Shin, IPS), which is 
based on the Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) regression for the cross-section unit. The IPS test 
tests the null hypothesis of a unit root for all cross-section unit. 
Table 2. Panel unit root tests 
Variable  
IPS Statistics 
 
Probability Levels 
MF -0.51538 0.3031 
BF 2.32216 0.9899 
CF -0.42665 0.3348 
UNE -3.51703 0.0002 
GDP -2.56595 0.0051 
RLR -2.79025 0.0026 
CAR 0.42656 0.6652 
CTI -4.75110 0.0000 
LR -4.40574 0.0000 
First differences   
dMF -8.99495 0.0000 
dBF -10.5914 0.0000 
dCF -8.54654 0.0000 
dUNE -8.57458 0.0000 
dGDP -14.0129 0.0000 
dRLR -10.6508 0.0000 
dCAR -10.5242 0.0000 
dCTI -14.2257 0.0000 
dLR -10.0232 0.0000 
 
The test results for the variables in level forms and in first differences are illustrated in 
Table 2. Some of the IPS statistics were able to reject the hypothesis that all countries have a unit 
root in levels. Since the unit root hypothesis can be clearly rejected for the level, we conclude that 
variables are not integrated of order 1, I(1) – the necessary condition for cointegration in a bivariate 
context. However, compared with FM-OLS, Dynamic OLS does not impose additional 
requirements in that all variables should be integrated of the same order, I(1) and that regressors 
themselves should not be cointegrated.  
5.2 Cointegration test 
We test for cointegration using Johansen fisher panel cointegration test proposed by 
Madalla and Wu (1999). Employing Johansen (1988) test for cointegration, Madalla and Wu 
(1999) consider Fisher’s (1932) suggestion to combine individual tests, proposing an alternative 
to the two tests, for testing for cointegration in the full panel by combining individual cross‐
sections tests for cointegration (Morshed, 2010).  
 
 
   
 
Table 3. Johansen Fisher Panel Cointegration Test 
Vector Hypothesis 
           𝐻0                      𝐻1                    
Test statistics 
Trace Max Eigenvalue 
(MF, UNE, GDP, RLR) r=0 r>1 141.3*** 107.0*** 
 r≤1 r>2 54.21*** 57.04*** 
(BF, UNE, GDP, RLR) r=0 r>1 109.3*** 98.23*** 
 r≤1 r>2 32.54*** 33.81*** 
(CF, UNE, GDP, RLR) r=0 r>1 94.62*** 85.48*** 
 r≤1 r>2 27.89** 28.19** 
Notes:  r indicates the number of cointegrating relationships. *** and ** indicates rejection at the 99 % and 
the 95% critical values, respectively. 
 
Results of Johansen Fisher cointegration tests are presented in Table 2 for the three sample 
models and indicate quite consistently the presence of at most a two cointegrating vector among 
the set of the variables. 
 
5.3 Dynamic OLS estimates  
After testing for cointegration test, the next step is to estimate the long-run effect of 
macroeconomic and bank-specific variables on non-performing financing of Islamic banks. For 
this, we employ panel Dynamic OLS (DOLS) estimator suggested by Kao and Chiang (2000). One 
of the important feature of the DOLS procedure is that it generates unbiased estimates for variables 
that cointegrate even with endogenous regressors. As a result, comparing with cross-sectional and 
conventional panel approaches, this approach does not require exogeneity assumptions nor does it 
require the use of instruments. Furthermore, the panel DOLS estimator is consistent under 
cointegration, and is robust to the omission of variables that do not form part of the cointegrating 
relationship (Hazer et al, 2012). 
Panel DOLS estimates are presented in Table 4, 5 and 6 with four model, for long-run 
effect of macroeconomic and bank-specific variables on non-performing financings. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: DOLS estimates of the long-run effect of macroeconomic and bank-
specific variables on mortgage financing 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                 M1           M2           M3           M4    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
UNE                         0.85289***   0.95352*     0.50625***   1.14183    
                             [0.25]       [0.54]       [0.14]       [0.80]    
GDP                        -0.44368***  -0.10823      0.06051      0.06234  
                             [0.11]       [0.12]       [0.04]       [0.14]    
RIR                         0.57997      0.31212      0.11264*     0.48053    
                             [0.53]       [0.20]       [0.06]       [0.33]    
CAR                                     -0.12148                              
                                          [0.08]                              
CTI                                                  -0.03388***                 
                                                       [0.00]                 
LR                                                                -0.04020    
                                                                    [0.03]    
  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Observations                    168          168          168          168    
Number of groups                  8            8            8            8 
Number of periods                21           21           21           21 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
  
 
Table 5: DOLS estimates of the long-run effect of macroeconomic and bank-
specific variables on business financing 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                 M1           M2           M3           M4    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
UNE                         1.28181***   1.62888*     1.11836***   2.38721**    
                             [0.39]       [0.85]       [0.27]       [1.09]    
GDP                        -0.83909***  -0.26138      0.03952      0.02618    
                             [0.18]       [0.20]       [0.08]       [0.23]    
RIR                         1.29552      0.36289      0.20156      0.77966*    
                             [0.83]       [0.33]       [0.12]       [0.43]    
CAR                                     -0.20910                              
                                          [0.13]                              
CTI                                                  -0.07485***                 
                                                       [0.01]                 
LR                                                                -0.08523*    
                                                                    [0.04]    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Observations                    168          168          168          168    
Number of groups                  8            8            8            8 
Number of periods                21           21           21           21 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: DOLS estimates of the long-run effect of macroeconomic and bank-
specific variables on consumer financing 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                 M1           M2           M3           M4    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
UNE                         0.22815*     0.23984      0.27052***   0.55496    
                             [0.11]       [0.25]       [0.07]       [0.39]    
GDP                        -0.15054**   -0.02424      0.02797     -0.03530    
                             [0.05]       [0.05]       [0.03]       [0.06]    
RIR                         0.62104**    0.12115      0.06579      0.17672    
                             [0.25]       [0.09]       [0.04]       [0.15]    
CAR                                     -0.01752                              
                                          [0.03]                              
CTI                                                  -0.01565***                 
                                                       [0.00]                 
LR                                                                -0.01388    
                                                                    [0.37]    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Observations                    168          168          168          168    
Number of groups                  8            8            8            8 
Number of periods                21           21           21           21 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
5.3.1 Model with macroeconomic variables  
It can be seen that the results for three mortgage financing, business financing and 
consumer financing show different statistically significant relationships with macroeconomic and 
banks-specific variables.  
More specifically, for all models, the estimated long-run coefficients for unemployment 
rate is positive and statistically significant. It is the expected sign according to the theoretical 
arguments mentioned in Section 4. Interestingly, unemployment has a significant stronger impact 
on business problem financing. It can be justified by that when business entities face difficulty in 
paying back financing, they attempt to cut their labor cost immediately. 
Moreover, unemployment plays a crucial role in mortgage and consumer non-performing 
financing, implying that an increase in unemployment affects households’ ability to pay back their 
debts. It is clear that households refer to bank financing relying on their regular salary. Although 
commercial banks usually extend the financing to government workers and high-skilled workers, 
who are less likely to get unemployed, Islamic banks are encourage to provide financing to sections 
of low-income segments of society with affordable financing costs.  
The non-performing financing ratios are negatively affected by economic growth for all 
financing types. In other words, economy growth leads to an increase in household income and 
revenue of firms and a decrease in financial distress. However, the problem financings get wors as 
economic growth becomes lower as household income and production shrinks.  
 The impact of economic growth rate is found to be larger for business non-performing 
financings. This indicates that the business sector’s ability to repay the bank financing is highly 
dependent on the phase of the economic cycle in Malaysia. This is maybe because of the financing 
for small business enterprises, as they are more vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks and less 
diversified. Furthermore, consumer and mortgage problem financing are also negatively related to 
the GDP growth rate. 
The coefficients for the real lending rates are positive as expected but only statistically 
significant for consumer problem financing. Consumer non-performing financing are positively 
associated with changes in lending rates. It should be noted that the majority of consumer financing 
are given at floating rate. Likewise, insignificant relationship of mortgage and business problem 
financing can be explained by fixed rate in mortgage and business financing. Moreover, type of 
contract involved in consumer financing may also influence on consumer problem financing 
because in Islamic finance, it is not allowed to renegotiate the term and conditions of financing 
contract. However, business and mortgage financing are usually long-term financing, which is 
more sensitive in changes in interest rate, therefore, floating profit rate is protected by ceiling rate. 
Moreover, financing rates has been remained low in past years. 
Overall, the most distinct implication of the estimates is that three non-performing 
financing are affected by macroeconomic variables in different level. Unemployment and the real 
GDP growth has the strongest effect on business non-performing financing. On the other hand, 
consumer problem financings are more responsive to the macroeconomic conditions. 
5.3.2 Model with bank-specific variables  
Models 2-4 present the DOLS estimation results for all three non-performing financing 
categories with bank-specific variables being included. By those models, we analyze which of the 
hypotheses presented in Section 3.1 is supported in Malaysian Islamic banking system. 
Unfortunately, the macro-variables became unstable across different models, when bank-
specific variables are included. Only the effect of unemployment rate on non-preforming financing 
categories is very close to the estimations of the baseline models. 
Moreover, the coefficient of the inefficiency is negative and statistically significant for all 
nor-performing financing categories, thus, stating against the ‘bad management’ hypothesis. This 
finding is because of Islamic banks in Malaysia adopted strong corporate governance practices. 
The final decision in the process of financing is not only dependent on bank managers but also it 
depends on Shari’ah committee permissions. Thus, Islamic banks perform well under Sharia’h 
principles. 
In addition, bank’s risk appetite, measured by the solvency ratio, does not have statistical 
power in explaining the relationship between capital adequacy ratio and three non-performing 
financings. A possible explanation is that Islamic banks always expands their capital buffers. They 
are not allowed to go to derivative markets to raise capital. Moreover, Islamic banks practice profit-
lose sharing principles in attracting deposits as well. Investment accounts are not considered as 
liability and therefore, the share of investment accounts is deducted from total risk-weighted assets. 
Solvency ratio is the main requirement, which credit organizations must comply with. It 
indicates the bank's capacity to neutralize possible financial losses, at their own expense, not at the 
expense of their clients. Therefore, Bank Negara of Malaysia tend to have a regular overview of 
the riskiness of financing portfolio in all Islamic banks. As a result, potential high level of non-
performing financing due to moral hazard incentives of the bank managers is minimized. 
Moreover, as approved by Bank Negara Malaysia, the risk management functions of the 
Islamic banks is governed by the Risk Management Framework. 
The key elements of the Group's Risk Management Framework are as follows: 
- Risk Governance; 
- Risk Appetite; 
- Risk Management Processes; 
- Risk Culture. 
The four broad processes for risk management which lead to a balanced risk-return 
framework are as follows (Figure 1): 
Figure 1: Risk management process in Islamic banks 
 
 
 
 
Our empirical results indicate that the leverage ratio does not effect on risk-taking behavior 
of Islamic banks as well. In contrast, leverage has a negative and statistically significant effect on 
business problem financings. This result indicates that if leverage tends to increase non-performing 
financing, Islamic banks will enhance risk and system of internal control ensuring implementation 
of risk policies and compliance well.  
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Unique key elements of Islamic banks’ risk culture is ensured by effective enterprise-wide 
risk management framework. Key elements are as follows: (i) strong corporate governance, (ii) 
organizational structure with clearly defined roles and responsibilities, (iii) effective 
communication and training, (iv) commitment to compliance with laws, regulations and internal 
controls, (v) integrity in fiduciary responsibilities, and (vi) clear policies, procedures and 
guidelines. Overall, Islamic banks do not experience more difficulties under the leverage ratio 
because there are generally protected by effective risk management framework. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
Financing is the basis of the banking and the basis on which to judge the quality and on the 
Bank's performance in where level of non-performing financing plays a key role. Special attention 
deserves the credit risk management process, because of its quality depends on the success of the 
bank. Researches around the world suggest that the main reason for bank failures was the poor 
quality of assets. The growth of "bad" debts is one of the main reasons which gradually destroys 
capital and, ultimately, leads to the bankruptcy of bank and the instability in economy. 
Due to such importance of problem financing, many researches have been conducted to 
investigate the determinants of non-performing financings. However, the majority of studies are 
limited to only conventional banks. As Islamic banking system operates under Shari’ah principles, 
appealing intuition that Islamic banks are exposed to macroeconomic changes and bank-specific 
characteristics differently. Applying wrong policy tools derived from conventional banking system 
findings may lead to unfavorable results for Islamic banks. Therefore, this paper made a humble 
attempt to fill this gap in the literature by providing new empirical evidence on the determinants 
of non-performing financing in Islamic banks. 
Unlike other studies, we have investigated the determinants of non-performing financing 
for each financing portfolio in the Malaysian banking sector with a view that both macroeconomic 
changes and bank-specific characteristics influence on assets quality at different level. 
By employing Dynamic OLS method, we have examined eight Islamic banks in Malaysia 
spanning from 2010Q4 and 2016Q3.  Due to difference in disclosure of information in balance-
sheet, our observation became small. However, Dynamic OLS takes care of small sample bias and 
simultaneity bias. 
We find that macroeconomic variables, particularly, the unemployment rate and real GDP 
growth rate have strong impact on level of non-performing financing. However, when bank 
specific variables were added into the baseline models, GDP growth and real lending rate lost their 
power in explaining in change in problem financing. The insignificant estimates indicate that 
Islamic banks in Malaysia adopt key elements of effective risk management with well-developed 
credit policies and procedures, good portfolio management, effective control of credit, and most 
importantly a well-trained staff to work in the system.  
These elements ensure Islamic banks to mitigate systematic changes occurred in 
macroeconomic environment namely, changes in real GDP growth or in real lending rate. Banks 
are successful only when the risks taken are reasonable, controlled and are within their financial 
capabilities and competence. This is all the basis of the bank's risk-taking policy and management 
of Islamic banks in Malaysia. On the other hand, impact of unemployment rate is stable across 
different models. This indicates that Islamic banks should find the ways to mitigate risks derived 
from the growth in unemployment rate. 
Implications from the findings can be extended to regulators and policy makers in countries 
where Islamic finance is developing rapidly. We document evidence supporting that 
unemployment growth may serve as key indicator for future problem financing. This suggests that 
regulatory authorities should focus on more social and corporate governance performance scores 
of firms to ensure more stable employment. Moreover, regulatory authorities should emphasis on 
quality of risk management in Islamic banking system and its procedures to avoid from future 
financial instability. 
The study can be extended in many ways. A larger set of Islamic banks across various 
countries can be examined to reach substantive conclusions about the impact of macroeconomic 
variables and bank-specific characteristics on level of non-performance financing. This, in turn, 
allows to use more advanced techniques which can handle statistical issues.  
 
Limitations of this paper 
The following limitations of this paper presents opportunities for future research. First, 
non-performing financing for each financing categories is not available in online databases. 
Differences in disclosure of information on impaired financing among Islamic banks limited our 
sample to only eight Islamic banks. Secondly, OLS estimator faces the following econometric 
issues: (i) time invariant country characteristics may be correlated with explanatory variables, (ii) 
the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error term and (iii) the endogenety 
of some explanatory variables.  
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